| Stanley Brooks was living the
dream. With a $16,000 investment in 1990, Brooks built
Brookstreet Securities of Irvine, Calif., into a $150
million revenue firm — placing it among the top 25
independent broker/dealers. By 2007, the firm had
amassed $8 billion in client assets and 680 registered
reps. Along the way, Brooks picked up some black marks —
nine regulatory “disclosures” on his U4, eight of which
were related to supervisory failures. But Brookstreet
continued to prosper anyway: “We never had a bad year,”
Brooks recalls.
Nonetheless, Brookstreet couldn't dodge the bullet this
time. In what will most surely go down as a colossal
failure to supervise (among other potential regulatory
violations) and a series of actions motivated by greed,
Brookstreet Securities is dead. Its assets were blown on
multiple margin calls, its reps were suddenly forced to
jump to other firms and perhaps dozens of retail clients
were decimated by a risky, complicated investing
strategy. As few as five to 10 reps may have been
involved, according to one lawyer who is himself
representing 30 to 40 disgruntled Brookstreet clients.
Indeed, Brookstreet will probably be remembered as a
b/d that was too aggressive, too greedy, too stupid and
perhaps even grossly negligent in the way it ran some of
its clients' money. The thing is, when a complicated
trade works, and a handful of brokers and their clients
are quite literally printing money, some brokers just go
for it. The mastermind behind the trades at Brookstreet,
a man with a checkered past (see sidebar pg. 34), was
living so large that even otherwise clean and prudent
reps decided to play the odds, says one observer with
knowledge of the case.
In the month since the firm collapsed, regulators
have been crawling over Brookstreet headquarters,
collecting books, records and trying to find out which
rules (if any) Brookstreet reps broke. Along with some
individual brokers, Brooks, his reputation and any
remaining assets he may have will soon be under attack
from the dozen or so law firms trolling for injured
Brookstreet clients, several of whom have been described
as modest, risk-averse retirees and pre-retirees. The
question becomes, how many other broker/dealers are
sitting on significantly devalued (or even worthless)
securities? Can an individual rep even know what risk
other reps may be taking that may potentially damage his
firm? One thing is certain, it's not too often that a
broker/dealer goes belly up on bad trades.
DEATH BY CMO
Brookstreet's sudden change of fortune started on
June 14 when an unknown number of institutional and
individual customer accounts got hit with margin calls
from Brookstreet's clearing firm, National Financial
Services, a unit of Fidelity Investments. The calls were
related to investments in collateralized mortgage
obligations, many of them in high-risk varieties called
“inverse floaters” and “interest only strips,” which had
suddenly been priced down, an inherent risk carried by
the instruments. The re-pricings resulted in significant
devaluations for many of the investors, some of whom had
borrowed as much as 90 percent of their total investment
from NFS.
Cliff Popper, Brookstreet firm's top producer, the
man who built the CMO program and managed those heavily
leveraged portfolios, resigned earlier in June when,
according to Brooks, he asked Popper to help him
liquidate some customers' CMO positions. By June 22,
Brooks had spent his firm's entire net capital of $12
million to meet a margin balance. In fact, after
reducing margin exposure by 80 percent, “That still left
a $70 million margin balance against $85 million of
value,” Brooks said in a letter to brokers. Of course,
that $85 million was being revalued downward even as he
was writing the note, he indicated in the letter. He
also warned: “I have told many of you that you are
always in danger of not being paid on your last check
when working for any broker/dealer… I will try to get
enough money from our account at NFS to complete our
upcoming payrolls.” Brooks, whose company motto was
“press on and never give up,” was forced to close the
firm. In the end, he says he still owed NFS $2.5
million; regulators, lawyers and investors are now left
to clean up the mess.
What happened? “It's pretty typical for a regional
b/d trafficking in this stuff that's over its head to
lose its shirt,” says a trader at one of Wall Street's
large mortgage trading shops. He's referring to 1994,
the last time the CMO market collapsed, when firms like
Piper Jaffray and Alex. Brown lost millions in CMOs and
CMO derivative investments. “People see Triple A-rated
and think, ‘Oh, how bad can it be?’” he says. (Because
CMOs are agency backed, their various tranches, which
have completely different risk profiles, retain their
triple A rating.) But investing in this area is tricky
and complicated. “It's all about the timing of cash
flows, which are dependent on mortgage prepayments, and
there's a very complex system of inputs to determine
what those are,” he says. In other words, most reps
don't understand how the investment works — let alone
the risk involved — and therefore neither will their
clients. The sale of these products to Brookstreet's
retail clients was wrong, he says. “Is an inverse
floater CMO a retail product? If I were a compliance
guy, no way,” he says.
Collateralized mortgage obligations, first introduced
in 1983, are not considered inherently risky
investments, but CMO derivatives are. There were between
45 and 75 brokers selling “regular” CMOs to some portion
of Brookstreet's 88,000 customers, according to Stan
Brooks. That represents roughly 10 percent of the reps
at Brookstreet, most of whom “were insurance and mutual
fund guys,” in the words of one rep. But all 680 of them
suddenly lost their jobs on June 22. Beyond plain
vanilla CMOs, an unknown number of those 75 brokers —
some say as many as 10, including some of the firm's top
producers — were also selling “inverse floaters” and
“interest only strips,” especially volatile classes of
CMOs, which were made even more risky because they were
sold on up to 90 percent margin.
And yet, the securities were being sold to retail
clients as Triple-A-rated instruments offering
guaranteed returns with no risk to principal, says
New York attorney Stuart Meissner who is representing
several Brookstreet clients.
According to Brooks, the CMO business, which was
little more than three years old, accounted for 10
percent of monthly firm-wide revenues, which were
averaging $14 million to $16 million per month. It was
good business — and not just for the firm, he says.
Clients in the program were seeing returns in the seven
to eight percent range, with up to 14 to 16 percent for
some, primarily those who'd stuck it out and reinvested
in the program, Brooks says.
What's A CMO?
A CMO is a security made up of pools of home
mortgages backed by U.S. government-sponsored agencies
like Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. Each pool generates two
streams of income: one from the aggregate of the
interest payments, the other from the aggregate of the
principal payments made on the mortgages. These income
streams are divided into “tranches,” which are the
securities sold to investors.
In a “Compliance Alert” issued around the time
Brookstreet was collapsing, NASD warned members about
improper CMO sales to retail customers. Citing “several
examinations of broker/dealers,” the regulator said it
found that the b/ds “had sold some of the most complex
and riskiest classes of securities to their retail
customers.” The alert also mentioned that investors had
received misleading sales literature (or no disclosure
at all) and unsuitable sales recommendations, and warned
that adequate supervision of sales materials and sales
practices was lacking.
One of the risks associated with CMO derivatives like
inverse floaters and interest-only strips — both of
which were sold to Brookstreet clients — is that their
value fluctuates wildly with small moves in interest
rates. They're also illiquid. For these reasons, most
independent b/ds don't touch these securities.
But Brookstreet found out there's another major risk
with these types of investments: Pricing can be
guesswork. Brooks blames the re-pricing of the bonds, an
occurrence he says was monthly before June 14, when it
became daily, for the collapse of his firm. “I still
don't know why the pricing model changed,” says Brooks
who admits to not totally understanding the IDC pricing
service NFS uses to price the CMOs. “Did the investment
stop paying interest? Principal? No, it didn't. There
may be a lot of smart guys out there that may tell me
I'm wrong about this one day, but to my understanding
it's the re-pricing that caused this,” he says.
But like any investment, of course, “pricing” risk,
to use Brooks' term, is always there, especially with
derivatives amped with leverage. “With stuff like
inverse floaters, guys only get them marked once a month
and often by a pricing service, not by a real b/d,” says
the same trader that called the CMO derivatives
non-retail investments. “So it's an extrapolated price.
In a volatile market, the pricing service's value may be
very different from what you would realize if you needed
to get out of a position right away,” he says.
NFS' decision to re-price may have stemmed from
general concern regarding mortgage-related investments.
It was that same week in June that Bear Stearns suffered
multi-billion dollar losses in two of its hedge funds:
the aptly named “High Grade Structured Credit Strategies
Enhanced Leverage Fund,” and the “High Grade Structured
Credit Strategies Fund.” Both funds' losses were
magnified by 90 percent margin leverage. Brooks says the
market pressure created by the Bear Stearns news made
Brookstreet's losing positions in an illiquid market
that much harder to offload. Asked why the firm
re-priced the securities, NFS spokesman Adam Banker
would not say anything further than “we are not
responsible” for what happened at Brookstreet, and that
client margin lending obligations are clearly laid out
in their contracts.
WHO WILL GET SPANKED?
Whether the brokers who sold retail clients risky
CMOs violated suitability requirements or misrepresented
the investments, or whether inappropriate amounts of
leverage were used will come out as regulators and
plaintiffs' lawyers begin to present their cases. Sam
Edwards, a Houston attorney with Shephard Smith &
Edwards, says his firm is representing 30 to 40 former
Brookstreet clients that allege all kinds of wrongdoing
on the part of between five and 10 Brookstreet brokers.
That list of brokers includes Popper, the mastermind of
the strategy (see sidebar) and Barry Kornfeld, a
principal in a group of Brookstreet reps in Coral
Gables, Fla., called The CMO Bond Group. Neither Popper
nor Kornfeld returned calls for comment.
Meissner, who
has fielded many calls from former Brookstreet clients,
says his clients' complaints relate to “three or four
brokers.” He says most of his clients are reporting
losses between $200,000 and $400,000. “None of these
people were rich,” he says. Meissner says all of his
clients have told him virtually the same thing: their
broker sold them the CMO investments as triple-A rated
bonds with no risk to principal, and a guaranteed 10
percent return. “That's the story, no matter where the
client is from,” says Meissner, who says fluctuations in
price were explained to clients as temporary.
One client,
who lost his entire initial investment of $200,000 — all
of his liquid assets, according to Meissner — was
invested in a portfolio of 14 CMO bond positions, half
of which were “inverse floaters” or “interest only
strips,” and on 80 percent margin. “This client says he
told his broker he wanted an investment that was safe
and secure,” says Meissner, who adds that the
Brookstreet rep assured him it was. One of the seven
inverse floaters his client owned showed a current face
value of $3,117,610.92, as of April 30. But, the
estimated current market value was only $108,991.68,
according to the client's statement.
Brokers at wirehouse firms contacted repeatedly told
Registered Rep. that they stayed away from such
investments with clients because the “risk wasn't worth
it.” A top Smith Barney broker that used his Bloomberg
station to look up the CUSIP number of the bond
mentioned above had this to say upon reading its
description: “That's a bond with a lot of hair on it.
You're in an area here that 98 percent of your readers
don't dabble in, thank God.” He quoted Warren Buffett
for emphasis: “Derivatives are what you get when you
combine MBAs and ignorance,” and “You never know who's
swimming naked until the tide goes out.”
THE “GENIUS” BEHIND BROOKSTREET'S CMO BIZ
The man who built Brookstreet's CMO business,
managed the portfolios and basked in the glory of being
Brookstreet's top producer was Cliff Popper, a Boca
Raton-based broker with a rather active U4. It shows 13
firms in the 15 years prior to joining Brookstreet in
2004. According to an old boss of Popper's who spoke on
the condition of anonymity, the 37-year old Popper had
done very well for himself and clients by investing in
CMOs and CMO derivatives like inverse floaters and
interest-only strips. Besides driving a BMW Z8 and
owning a skybox at Miami's Dolphin Stadium, according to
one source, Popper was also rumored to be producing $1
million a month in revenue while at Brookstreet. He was
“clever,” says his old boss. Because interest rates were
declining or stable for so many years, investors in CMO
derivatives juiced with leverage made a lot of money, he
says.
But Popper didn't know when to walk away, says his
former boss. It was Popper's penchant for leverage that
eventually made him unwelcome at his firm, as well as
other firms Popper later joined, he says. When Popper
was working for him, he says he asked him to reign in
his leveraged positions in CMO derivatives and, when
Popper resisted, he was asked to leave.
Despite working in the buttoned-up world of financial
services, Popper's private life appears to have been
anything but. In fact, he is something of a ladies man —
or was, on his MySpace page, anyway. The page, which he
made private soon after it got the attention of
regulators, attorneys and Registered Rep.,
included a “friends” page chock-full of bikini and
thong-wearing women posing (mostly from behind), lying
down, bent over or embracing other women. Scrolling down
the page several half-naked cartoons danced around the
page to a song laced with sexually-explicit lyrics. An
SEC official who was asked if he'd seen the page laughed
sheepishly, said yes, then said that the SEC is not
interested in anything that doesn't provide facts about
Popper's involvement in Brookstreet's demise. But he did
call the site an aspect of his “character.” Enough said |