The top securities regulator in Massachusetts has sued
UBS on the grounds of fraud, saying that the firm misled
clients when it sold them auction-rate securities and
that it pushed the increasingly risky instruments on
individual investors to reduce its own potential losses.
The roughly $300 billion market for auction-rate
securities ground to a halt last February when buyers
all but vanished. Existing holders were locked into
shares and notes issued by municipalities, tax-exempt
institutions, student loan companies and closed-end
funds. Many of these investors say they were told that
the securities were as safe and liquid as cash and had
no idea that their holdings could be tied up
indefinitely.
In the complaint, William F. Galvin, secretary of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, cited numerous and
sometimes urgent e-mail messages indicating that as
early as last August UBS executives knew the market was
imperiled. As sellers began to outnumber buyers, the
messages show, UBS executives urged the sales force to
promote the notes and shares as aggressively and widely
as possible.
“The thing that is most amazing to me is what a
comprehensive and deliberate strategy this was by UBS,”
Mr. Galvin said. “They wanted to reduce their inventory,
so they decided to gear up their sales campaign using
cashlike arguments deliberately.”
Mr. Galvin wants UBS to buy investors out at the
prices they paid for the securities and to make up any
losses for clients who have sold their stakes.
A UBS spokeswoman expressed disappointment that the
lawsuit had been filed Thursday and said the firm was
working on solutions to the frozen market for
auction-rate securities. “We will defend the specific
allegations of the complaint,” the firm said in a
statement. “Contrary to the allegations, UBS is
committed to serving the best interests of our clients.”
Many Wall Street firms sold auction-rate securities
to clients and acted as underwriter to issuers that
needed capital. Recently, some of the issuers, including
Eaton Vance and John Hancock, have bought investors out
of their frozen holdings. But the only relief offered by
Wall Street firms like UBS has been to allow their
clients to borrow against the value of their holdings.
Auction rate securities are debt obligations
whose interest rates are set at auctions every 7 to 35
days. The bonds typically have maturities of 30 years,
but the preferred shares have no maturity dates.
A true auction, however, involves a meeting of buyers
and sellers to determine the price and yield of the
securities. But Wall Street firms in charge of the
auctions had stepped in with their own capital in recent
years; it was easier than locating thousands of buyers
to meet up with sellers every week or so.
As the credit crisis deepened last year, the firms no
longer had as much capital to devote to keeping the
auctions going. Investors were stuck.
According to a Dec. 15 e-mail message attached to the
complaint, UBS underwrote $43 billion of the securities,
or about 14 percent of the total market. That message
also estimated that the wealth management unit of UBS,
which includes individual investors, held $33 billion of
auction-rate securities.
The Massachusetts complaint identified David Shulman,
UBS’s global head of fixed income distribution, as a
major participant in the firm’s effort last fall to
unload its inventory of auction-rate securities. But in
August, even as he was urging employees to drum up
clients to buy the securities, Mr. Shulman began selling
his personal stake in the instruments, the complaint
said. By Dec. 12, Mr. Shulman had sold his entire
position in the securities.
In testimony before Massachusetts investigators, Mr.
Shulman said that his “risk tolerance” drove him to
sell. He said he replaced the securities with issues
that were more liquid and that seemed to offer “more
protection,” according to the complaint.
UBS said Mr. Shulman would not be available for
comment.
The internal UBS documents released by Mr. Galvin
show that the stress in the market for auction-rate
securities began last August and continued through the
fall as the firm’s institutional customers moved to sell
their holdings. This required UBS to find buyers for the
securities or to take them onto its books.
“It is critical that we reach out on a wholesale
basis away from our traditional buying base to recognize
this value and similarly understand the credit
dynamics,” a Sept. 12 e-mail message stated. “I want to
broaden our distribution base and need us to better
market this product and educate our groups.”
The firm’s individual investor clients were a target,
the complaint contends. An August e-mail message said:
“We have encouraged” wealth management partners “to
mobilize the troops internally to focus on value so that
we can move more product through the system.”
But as the year was ending, the problem was
unresolved. Asking for a sales force call on the matter
on Dec. 11, Mr. Shulman wrote: “We need to move this
paper and have to explore all angles possible. ... we
need to do this as quickly as possible. ... please work
on this priority.”
So far, almost 100 investor arbitration cases have
been filed against UBS and other firms that sold these
securities.
Stuart D. Meissner, a New York lawyer,
represents a handful of investors who have brought such
cases. He said the messages attached to the
Massachusetts complaint should help investors who have
sued UBS. “What they released today opens up the window
toward punitive damages in any arbitrations filed
against UBS,” he said. “There are smoking guns in this
report that UBS will have a difficult time
circumventing.”
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