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Recent News and Case Filings Involving the Meissner Firm
of Interest to the General Public

May 29, 2009
By Suzanne Barlyn
   A DOW JONES NEWSWIRES COLUMN

COMPLIANCE WATCH: Why Brookstreet Investors Were In The Dark

NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--New details in the Brookstreet Securities Corp. case support investor advocates' calls for lifting the curtain higher on details of brokers' transactions, particularly how brokers are compensated and their use of margin accounts.

The Securities and Exchange Commission on Thursday filed fraud charges against 10 former brokers for Brookstreet, an Irvine, Calif., brokerage that collapsed in scandal in 2007. It said the brokers falsely marketed investments in derivatives of mortgage-backed securities as safe and appropriate for investors with conservative goals, including retirees. In many cases, they allegedly told investors the securities were backed by the U.S. government. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or Finra, also charged six Brookstreet brokers in a parallel enforcement action.

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09/26/08

Feds seek collapse culprits

Taxpayers, lawmakers want somebody to take the rap

Pensacola News Journal

If there's a criminal side to the financial crisis that has pummeled U.S. homeowners and Wall Street institutions, it has yet to surface in a big way.

But that may change.

The Securities and Exchange Commission, the federal agency that oversees the stock market, has embarked on what top officials described as a "sweeping " investigation into possible market manipulation of the securities of certain financial institutions.

FBI Director Robert Mueller said his agency has 24 open investigations focused on large corporations where illegal activity may have occurred during the September market meltdown that led the Bush administration to propose a $700 billion rescue plan.

"The FBI will pursue these cases as far up the corporate chain as is necessary to ensure that those responsible receive the justice they deserve," Mueller told a congressional panel last week.

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09/08/08

Investing in Funds: A Monthly Analysis --- In Auction Securities Crisis, Are Brokers the Victims, Too?

By Daisy Maxey - The Wall Street Journal

In July, Anotolio Pellizzetti, a 70-year-old retired physician in Tavernier, Fla., filed an arbitration claim accusing UBS AG's wealth-management unit of fraud in selling him $2.5 million of auction-rate securities. Arbitration claims over investment products gone bad are nothing unusual on Wall Street, but one feature of this litigation stands out: Mr. Pellizzetti was referred to an attorney by his son -- a former UBS broker who first sold his father the securities.

For years, financial advisers promoted auction-rate securities to clients, friends and even family. Now, in the latest twist of the roiled credit markets, some brokers are siding with customers who allege that the securities weren't as billed. They were widely pitched as higher-yielding alternatives to easily bought-and-sold, super-safe money-market mutual funds -- but investors like Mr. Pellizzetti have been trapped in them since February, unable to cash out at full value after the market for auction-rate securities collapsed.

The auction-market crisis appears to be slowly working itself out. In recent weeks, most of Wall Street's biggest brokerage firms, including UBS, have agreed to buy back more than $40 billion of auction-rate securities from their clients, including individuals, charities and small businesses. Some have reached pacts with state and federal authorities to resolve probes into their sales, while other investigations continue. The pacts may help investors like Mr. Pellizzetti get their money back.

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04/21/08

Staten Island couple getting savings back after financial adviser hurt them

BY PHYLLIS FURMAN
DAILY NEWS BUSINESS WRITER

It's worth fighting back if you think you've been duped in the stock market.

It worked for retirees Stephen and Linda Davis.

The Staten Island couple filed an arbitration claim last year against their financial adviser, Charles Moni, and his brokerage firm, Jesup & Lamont Securities, alleging that their money had been invested in risky investments that cost them their retirement savings.

The couple, whose story was told in January in a Your Money special report on early retirement scams, lost $680,000 over two years. The Davises said they didn't know Moni had a history of customer complaints and settlements.

Moni plowed 59% of their money into one stock, in which they lost $450,000 in a single day, when the company, Rigel Pharmaceuticals, plummeted 64%. Rigel shares did recover, but long after the couple closed their account.

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03/01/08

The Law Offices of Stuart D. Meissner LLC has launched an investigation into Auction Rate Securities.


01/21/2008

Couple loses a fortune, sues broker

By Phyllis Furman
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS BUSINESS WRITER

For some retirees, handing over money to the wrong financial adviser can turn a nest egg into a nightmare.

In April 2004, Stephen Davis, then 64, had just sold his title search company. The Staten Island businessman was banking on the $1 million he netted to support his and his wife Linda's retirement, and to pay college tuition for their youngest child, Randy.

"I wanted to make sure my wife would be taken care of if God forbid something happened to me," Stephen Davis said.

The Davises took their $1 million, plus $500,000 more in savings, and turned it over to Charles Moni, a broker at Jesup & Lamont Securities of Manhattan.

The couple said they told Moni they hoped for income of about $150,000 a year from their account - 10% - but wanted it managed conservatively, they allege in an arbitration claim filed against the broker and Jesup & Lamont. "He said, 'No problem,' " Stephen Davis recalled.

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01/16/2008

Aggrieved Investors Sue a Clearing Firm
By JAIME LEVY PESSIN Wall Street Journal

Dozens of investors are suing a stock trade-processing firm over its role in their heavily margined investments in mortgage-backed securities, reawakening a debate over how much responsibility these "clearing" firms share for misdeeds committed by brokerage firms.

Lawyers say they have filed more than 40 arbitration claims against Brookstreet Securities Corp., an Irvine, Calif., brokerage that shut last summer, in which they also blame National Financial Services, a unit of Fidelity Investments, for clients' losses.

No Lifeguards?

The common thread is an allegation that National Financial allowed them to go deep into margin debt even though the collateralized mortgage obligations in their accounts were illiquid, and therefore virtually worthless.

Stuart Meissner, a lawyer who in December filed two lawsuits on behalf of five Brookstreet investors, said National Financial played an active role in his clients' losses. "Without them, the damages could not have been incurred," Mr. Meissner said. "They were a necessary component to the fraud."

Fidelity spokesman Vincent Loporchio said the claims against National Financial are without merit. "The decision to take margin loans is made by clients and their brokers, not by clearing firms," he said. National Financial "used reputable third-party firms to price the securities held in brokerage accounts," he said.

Tom Fehn, the lawyer for Brookstreet and its executives, declined to comment on the cases.

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11/27/2007

BROKER'S WORLD: Age-Bias Probe Examines M Stanley Layoffs

By Evelyn Juan 
A Dow Jones Newswires Column 

Morgan Stanley (MS), like several other brokerage firms, expects experienced financial advisors to generate more business than less-experienced ones.

Now regulators want to know if the firm discriminated against older brokers who didn't meet that higher standard.

In a letter dated Nov. 6 and sent to hundreds of former Morgan Stanley brokers, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission said it is conducting an investigation into large-scale layoffs by the New York-based firm in August 2005.

At the time, Morgan Stanley laid off around 1,000 brokers who failed to meet new production hurdles. As brokers gained seniority, they had to generate higher commissions and fees to remain employed.

At issue is a common practice at brokerage firms. A number of them, including Morgan Stanley and Citigroup Inc. (C) unit Smith Barney, ratchet up demands on experienced brokers. For a given production level, less experienced brokers retain a higher percentage of the commissions and fees they generate than more experienced brokers, particularly those in the low or middle ranges of production.

In Morgan Stanley's case, the firm went so far as to lay off experienced brokers who didn't generate a high enough production.

The EEOC probe isn't the only potential challenge to Morgan Stanley over age discrimination. A federal lawsuit filed by Edward Sullivan, former regional director at the firm's wealth management unit, is pending before the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York. Sullivan, a 25-year Morgan veteran in his mid-50s at the time, alleged that he was fired in May 2006 on the basis of his age.

It remains to be seen what the EEOC will find in the Morgan Stanley layoffs. But some lawyers at brokerage firms and pay consultants say an adverse finding by the EEOC could force a rethinking of pay structures linked to years of service.

Lawyers at brokerage firms say it makes sense to require more production from more experienced advisors. "It has nothing to do with age, it has to do with the number of years of production," said a lawyer at a competitor to Morgan Stanley. Still, with an adverse EEOC finding, depending on specifics, "you'd have to change the pay structure."

Garry Stegeland, general counsel and chief compliance officer for Ryan Beck, which has been acquired by Stifel Financial Corp. (SF), said requiring more of experienced brokers is "appropriate," but "It's a dangerous course of conduct if you use it as your only" criterion in dismissals. "If it winds up with a disproportionate number of 'protected class' people being terminated, it is an issue." People in protected classes have their employment shielded by law to reverse the effects of past discrimination.

To ward off potential lawsuits, said Robert Salwen, a compensation consultant, firms could have a pay structure that is purely based on production. Pegging part of compensation on length of service may discourage veteran brokers from resting on their laurels, but "if that's the case, then there may be an age component."

Rising demands on aging brokers will become a growing issue because, say consultants, the age of the average broker is rising. "It's an aging industry and it's becoming a bigger problem," said Philip Palaveev, a senior consultant on financial advisory at Moss Adams.

Hard data on brokers' demographics at major wirehouses are hard to come by. Among independent advisors, a recent survey conducted by Moss Adams found the median age of practice owners is 49 years old this year, up slightly from 48 in 2004.

Among lead advisors, or brokers who are the lead contact for clients, around 34% are between 35 and 44 years old, and 32% are in the 45 to 54 age bracket, Moss Adams found this year. Around 17% are 55 to 65 years old; 14% are under 35 while 3% are over 65 years old.

When Morgan Stanley did its firings in 2005, it expected higher productivity from older brokers. The firm fired brokers with more than eight years' experience who produced $225,000 or less annually in fees and commissions. Those with five to eight years' experience were axed if they failed to produce $150,000, while those who had been in the industry for one to four years lost their jobs if they failed to produce at least $100,000.

Jim Wiggins, a Morgan Stanley spokesman, said the brokers were terminated on the basis of performance, not age.

Someone at Morgan Stanley familiar with the matter said there's nothing wrong with greater expectations for brokers who have more experience. "The expectation at firms like ours is you get a couple of years to ramp up production, then you should be a good producer," the person said. "Once you reach a maturity ... then I think everyone is apples to apples."

Robert Larocca, who represents the brokers who filed the age discrimination complaint at the EEOC in Philadelphia, declined to comment.

A spokeswoman at the EEOC said the commission does not confirm or deny whether a company is under investigation.

If the EEOC probe concludes the brokers' complaint has merit, the commission can pursue the case before a federal court on the plaintiffs' behalf, or simply signal the plaintiffs to pursue a court case on their own. If the investigation proves favorable to Morgan Stanley, the plaintiffs will have a hard time pursuing a federal lawsuit unless the court overturns EEOC's decision.

Attached to the EEOC letter to the fired brokers was a five-page questionnaire that asked basic information such as the brokers' age, 12-month production as of May 31, 2005, length of service at Morgan Stanley, and years of experience in the industry. Dow Jones Newswires reviewed a copy of the EEOC letter and received a detailed description of the questionnaire.

The EEOC also asked whether the brokers were replaced by people over 40 years old and if the brokers had heard that older people were being selected for termination.

The EEOC also inquired if the brokers know how many younger, "rising star" brokers and advisor trainees were employed or laid off at their location, and if their books of business were distributed to younger employees or new hires after they left.

The brokers have until Nov. 30 to respond to the EEOC letter. "We believe that if these allegations are substantiated," the EEOC letter said, "you may be entitled to relief."

For age-bias lawsuits, "The challenge is connecting that age is the reason" for layoffs or firings, said Stuart Meissner, a securities lawyer in New York. "It's not a simple task but it certainly can be proven, and has been."

(Evelyn Juan writes about the transformation of the brokerage business from a transaction-oriented model to fee-based financial advising.)

-By Evelyn Juan, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-2312; evelyn.juan@dowjones.com

Copyright (c) 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

08/24/2007

The Death of a Brokerage
How one of the top 25 Independent firms went under in an epic failure of management; an unfortunate example of what can go wrong when business seems to be going right.
Aug 1, 2007 12:00 PM, By John Churchill

Stanley Brooks was living the dream. With a $16,000 investment in 1990, Brooks built Brookstreet Securities of Irvine, Calif., into a $150 million revenue firm — placing it among the top 25 independent broker/dealers. By 2007, the firm had amassed $8 billion in client assets and 680 registered reps. Along the way, Brooks picked up some black marks — nine regulatory “disclosures” on his U4, eight of which were related to supervisory failures. But Brookstreet continued to prosper anyway: “We never had a bad year,” Brooks recalls.

Nonetheless, Brookstreet couldn't dodge the bullet this time. In what will most surely go down as a colossal failure to supervise (among other potential regulatory violations) and a series of actions motivated by greed, Brookstreet Securities is dead. Its assets were blown on multiple margin calls, its reps were suddenly forced to jump to other firms and perhaps dozens of retail clients were decimated by a risky, complicated investing strategy. As few as five to 10 reps may have been involved, according to one lawyer who is himself representing 30 to 40 disgruntled Brookstreet clients.

Indeed, Brookstreet will probably be remembered as a b/d that was too aggressive, too greedy, too stupid and perhaps even grossly negligent in the way it ran some of its clients' money. The thing is, when a complicated trade works, and a handful of brokers and their clients are quite literally printing money, some brokers just go for it. The mastermind behind the trades at Brookstreet, a man with a checkered past (see sidebar pg. 34), was living so large that even otherwise clean and prudent reps decided to play the odds, says one observer with knowledge of the case.

In the month since the firm collapsed, regulators have been crawling over Brookstreet headquarters, collecting books, records and trying to find out which rules (if any) Brookstreet reps broke. Along with some individual brokers, Brooks, his reputation and any remaining assets he may have will soon be under attack from the dozen or so law firms trolling for injured Brookstreet clients, several of whom have been described as modest, risk-averse retirees and pre-retirees. The question becomes, how many other broker/dealers are sitting on significantly devalued (or even worthless) securities? Can an individual rep even know what risk other reps may be taking that may potentially damage his firm? One thing is certain, it's not too often that a broker/dealer goes belly up on bad trades.

DEATH BY CMO

Brookstreet's sudden change of fortune started on June 14 when an unknown number of institutional and individual customer accounts got hit with margin calls from Brookstreet's clearing firm, National Financial Services, a unit of Fidelity Investments. The calls were related to investments in collateralized mortgage obligations, many of them in high-risk varieties called “inverse floaters” and “interest only strips,” which had suddenly been priced down, an inherent risk carried by the instruments. The re-pricings resulted in significant devaluations for many of the investors, some of whom had borrowed as much as 90 percent of their total investment from NFS.

Cliff Popper, Brookstreet firm's top producer, the man who built the CMO program and managed those heavily leveraged portfolios, resigned earlier in June when, according to Brooks, he asked Popper to help him liquidate some customers' CMO positions. By June 22, Brooks had spent his firm's entire net capital of $12 million to meet a margin balance. In fact, after reducing margin exposure by 80 percent, “That still left a $70 million margin balance against $85 million of value,” Brooks said in a letter to brokers. Of course, that $85 million was being revalued downward even as he was writing the note, he indicated in the letter. He also warned: “I have told many of you that you are always in danger of not being paid on your last check when working for any broker/dealer… I will try to get enough money from our account at NFS to complete our upcoming payrolls.” Brooks, whose company motto was “press on and never give up,” was forced to close the firm. In the end, he says he still owed NFS $2.5 million; regulators, lawyers and investors are now left to clean up the mess.

What happened? “It's pretty typical for a regional b/d trafficking in this stuff that's over its head to lose its shirt,” says a trader at one of Wall Street's large mortgage trading shops. He's referring to 1994, the last time the CMO market collapsed, when firms like Piper Jaffray and Alex. Brown lost millions in CMOs and CMO derivative investments. “People see Triple A-rated and think, ‘Oh, how bad can it be?’” he says. (Because CMOs are agency backed, their various tranches, which have completely different risk profiles, retain their triple A rating.) But investing in this area is tricky and complicated. “It's all about the timing of cash flows, which are dependent on mortgage prepayments, and there's a very complex system of inputs to determine what those are,” he says. In other words, most reps don't understand how the investment works — let alone the risk involved — and therefore neither will their clients. The sale of these products to Brookstreet's retail clients was wrong, he says. “Is an inverse floater CMO a retail product? If I were a compliance guy, no way,” he says.

Collateralized mortgage obligations, first introduced in 1983, are not considered inherently risky investments, but CMO derivatives are. There were between 45 and 75 brokers selling “regular” CMOs to some portion of Brookstreet's 88,000 customers, according to Stan Brooks. That represents roughly 10 percent of the reps at Brookstreet, most of whom “were insurance and mutual fund guys,” in the words of one rep. But all 680 of them suddenly lost their jobs on June 22. Beyond plain vanilla CMOs, an unknown number of those 75 brokers — some say as many as 10, including some of the firm's top producers — were also selling “inverse floaters” and “interest only strips,” especially volatile classes of CMOs, which were made even more risky because they were sold on up to 90 percent margin.  And yet, the securities were being sold to retail clients as Triple-A-rated instruments offering guaranteed returns with no risk to principal, says New York attorney Stuart Meissner who is representing several Brookstreet clients.

According to Brooks, the CMO business, which was little more than three years old, accounted for 10 percent of monthly firm-wide revenues, which were averaging $14 million to $16 million per month. It was good business — and not just for the firm, he says. Clients in the program were seeing returns in the seven to eight percent range, with up to 14 to 16 percent for some, primarily those who'd stuck it out and reinvested in the program, Brooks says.

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Irvine broker Brookstreet faces liquidation Attorneys say clients lost money on risky investments tied to complex mortgage securities.
Attorneys say clients lost money on risky investments tied to complex mortgage securities.

By JOHN GITTELSOHN and RONALD CAMPBELL
THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER

In another fallout from Orange County's subprime mortgage industry collapse, Brookstreet Securities Corp., an Irvine broker dealer, shut its doors and laid off 100 local employees because it could not meet margin calls on complex securities backed by faltering mortgages, company spokeswoman Julie Mains said.

Mains said Brookstreet went from $16 million in capital Friday to being $3 million under water Wednesday because its clearing firm, National Financial Services, demanded payment for securities bought on margin.

The securities, known as collateralized mortgage obligations, lost value as Wall Street confidence in mortgage-backed securities collapsed. The most prominent collapse was this week's demise of two Bear Stearns & Co. hedge funds worth $20 billion that invested in collateralized mortgage obligations, which are mortgage-backed securities with varying maturity dates, risk and yields.

Mains said the value of Brookstreet's securities plunged to 18 cents on the dollar, forcing the company to dip into its capital to meet margin calls, which is when investors must increase deposits to meet minimum account requirements.

"It wasn't a problem with securities," she said. "It was a problem with the margins."

Adam Banker, a spokesman for National Financial's parent, Fidelity Investments Co., denied his company's margin calls forced Brookstreet's collapse.

The National Association of Securities Dealers ordered Brookstreet to liquidate its remaining accounts Wednesday, Mains said. Some customers lost the entire value of their investments while others "did indeed go negative," Mains said. She said clients should try to find another broker-dealer to take over their accounts.

Mains said clients should have known they were making risky investments, but consumer attorneys said CMOs should only be sold to pros.

Stuart Meissner, a New York attorney and former securities regulator, said he received calls from people whose Brookstreet accounts went from $250,000 to negative value. "They were supposedly guaranteed 10 percent returns," Meissner said.

Sam Edwards, a Houston attorney who has sued Brookstreet for investment malpractice, said he received calls from clients across the country complaining about losses in collateralized mortgage obligations bought on margin.

"These are very complicated, very high-risk securities and not appropriate for retail customers," Edwards said.

Brookstreet managed $571.6 million in 3,644 accounts, according to a Securities and Exchange Commission report. The report said 75 percent were individual investors who did not qualify as "high net worth," which means they had investable assets of less than $750,000.

Brookstreet has 15 days to recapitalize or, more likely, surrender its broker-dealer license, Mains said.


Meissner Efforts to Assure a Fair Panel Against Securities America, Concord Equity Group and Broker Andrew Sirico

Is This Game Already Over?

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

Published: June 18, 2006 Sunday New York Times

AFTER a Long Island charity that provides financial support for 190 current or former firefighters lost $614,036 in the stock market during the Internet bubble several years ago, it eventually did what many aggrieved investors do: it filed an arbitration case against its former broker, Andrew Sirico, contending that he had churned its account to rack up trading fees and had improperly invested its funds in speculative securities.

As is also routine in the brokerage business, a panel of three arbitrators — one representing the securities industry and two designated as public investor representatives — convened to hear the case of the charity, the East Islip Volunteer Firemen's Benevolent Association. But if the association's members hoped to get a speedy hearing, they were disappointed. Nearly 15 months have passed since the association filed its case, and the most basic facts in the dispute have yet to be argued.

Most of the delay is attributable to the time that Stuart D. Meissner, the association's lawyer in New York, has spent arguing that arbitrators assigned to the case were either biased or improperly classified as investor representatives when, instead, they were closely associated with the brokerage industry. Mr. Meissner said in an interview that he had found what he considered to be conflicts of interest with all five panelists assigned by NASD to the case.

Four of five candidates nominated to serve on the panel withdrew after Mr. Meissner's challenges. NASD Dispute Resolution, which is one of the securities industry's two main self-regulatory bodies, rejected his challenge on the fifth panelist. That arbitrator is now the panel's chairman.

Panelists who decide private arbitration cases are supposed to be completely neutral, like jurors hearing public court cases. But lawyers say that arbitrators with undisclosed ties to Wall Street or other potential conflicts that might disqualify them are common, as the East Islip firefighters' case, and others, demonstrate. Lawyers representing investors uncovered the possible conflicts in those cases, not NASD or the Big Board, also indicating that self-regulators have holes in their screening processes.

"In every instance we uncovered," Mr. Meissner said of his case, "it is clear the screening process is not being enforced and there is very little being done about checking on conflicts."

NASD says it does not discuss individual cases, but that its extensive screening process and the disclosure demands required of arbitrators keep its system fair and reliable. The New York Stock Exchange, which handles far fewer arbitration hearings than NASD, said the same about its resolution procedures.

In theory, private arbitration panels are supposed to offer a fast and fair system in which customers can resolve complaints with their brokers. Last year, according to NASD, the average turnaround time for a case was 14.3 months, down from 15.4 months in 2004. In 1995, the average was 10.5 months.

But from start to finish, the securities industry itself oversees the arbitration process. Brokerage firms require clients to file grievances with private arbitrators, not in state or federal court. Arbitration is the only forum that investors can use to resolve disputes — opening the door to the possibility of lax enforcement or, at worst, outright compromises of the system.

BOB SILHAN is secretary of the East Islip association, and its members include retired, indigent and disabled firefighters. "The biggest impact this has had is on our members' families," he said, adding that the association can give its families only about $3,500 in annual death benefits. "We were on the threshold of trying to increase that when all this happened."

Securities arbitration has become a thriving business. Last year, 6,074 cases were filed with NASD Dispute Resolution, which oversees more than 90 percent of investor complaints. The peak year for NASD cases was 2003, when 8,945 were filed — most of which, lawyers say, were related to the stock market fall that began in 2000. The number of cases filed this year is down 13 percent from 2005, NASD said.

According to NASD, the percentage of cases in which the plaintiff won an award has declined steadily since 2001. Then, 54 percent of cases were won by plaintiffs. By last year, that figure had fallen to 43 percent.

Arbitration as a way to resolve investor disputes really took off in 1987, after the Supreme Court ruled in a case known as Shearson/American Express v. McMahon that account forms signed by customers requiring that disputes be resolved in arbitration were enforceable contracts. Brokerage firms soon required all customers to sign such documents.

Securities lawyers who have conducted arbitrations for many years say that during the 1990's, arbitration seemed to work well — that it was an efficient, low-cost process that bypassed the increasingly clogged court system. No longer.

"Securities arbitration has become much more like formal court litigation in terms of the parties' investment of time and money," said Lewis D. Lowenfels, an expert in securities law at Tolins & Lowenfels in New York. "What started as a relatively swift and economical process for a public customer claimant to seek justice has evolved into a costly extended adversarial proceeding dominated by trial lawyers and the usual litigation tactics."

At the same time that brokerage firms defending themselves in arbitration are resorting to drawn-out litigation maneuvers, some lawyers say panelists are unwilling to push the defendants to produce documents they must maintain.

"There are brokerage firms and lawyers who in the face of rules requiring them to make documents available to the claimants do not do so," said John W. Moscow, a former prosecutor who is a lawyer at Rosner Moscow & Napierala in New York. "The unwillingness of arbitration panels to compel the firms to produce the records they are required to keep puts the less sophisticated and less well-funded claimants at a disadvantage. When a case gets heard only on evidence that one chooses to produce, that is not what the rules envisioned when the S.E.C. approved them."

Three-member panels oversee securities arbitrations. One member represents the financial industry and has expertise in the field; the other two act as public investors' representatives and can come from any arena.

Public panelists cannot have extensive associations with the financial services industry or any other relationship that could compromise their neutrality. Lawyers for both sides choose arbitrators from lists provided by NASD or the New York Stock Exchange. At NASD, for example, there is a pool of 6,340 arbitrators; 3,692 represent the public and the rest are industry panelists. In every case, lawyers for each side can strike arbitrators from the list of candidates during the initial selection process. If all are struck, the lawyers must accept NASD's choices for the panel. At that point, lawyers for both sides can challenge a panelist only for biases, misclassification, conflicts or undisclosed material information.

All arbitrators sign applications disclosing their professional histories and any other information — such as lawsuits filed against them — so that lawyers for both plaintiff and defendant can assess their fitness for a case. But arbitrators are expected to disclose any conflicts that may arise even after a case has begun. Under NASD rules, an arbitrator can be removed for biases or conflicts in the middle of hearing a case; the New York Stock Exchange does not yet allow for such a removal.

THE NASD arbitration manual states that arbitrators must disclose any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of an arbitration, and "any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or might create an appearance of partiality or bias." They must sign oaths stating that they have no personal interest in the case before they agree to hear it. Potential arbitrators must also disclose whether an investor has sued them or whether they have been subjected to regulatory inquiry. But according to lawyers who have uncovered evidence of bias in arbitrators, NASD does not seem to police the disclosures for omissions, disqualifications or conflicts. Steven B. Caruso, a lawyer at Maddox, Hargett & Caruso in New York and president-elect of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, a nonprofit group of 800 lawyers representing individual investors, recalled a recent case he had in Florida.

"The NASD sent me an arbitrator's profile of a guy who was a public arbitrator and he had previously run a securities firm," Mr. Caruso said. "So I challenged it to the NASD; they went to the arbitrator and came back to me and said, 'Well, he thinks he's properly assigned.' "After three or four exchanges they finally took him off my panel and reclassified him as an industry arbitrator. If you didn't have the tenacity or knowledge of the system, or if you were a pro se investor, you would have been taken advantage of."

In fact, NASD relies heavily on arbitrators themselves to make proper disclosures. Last month, Rina Spiewak, a staff attorney in NASD Dispute Resolution's West regional office, wrote an article published on the association's Web site entitled "When in Doubt, Disclose." In it, she wrote that arbitrators "have an affirmative duty to become aware of relationships that should be disclosed" and that the appearance of bias can be as harmful as an actual conflict.

LINDA FIENBERG, president of NASD Dispute Resolution, said her organization's screening and arbitrator training system is elaborate and laborious enough that some applicants drop out of the process. "We believe that our rules are adhered to," she said. "As soon as something comes to our attention that suggests there has been a mistake we obviously look into it and take appropriate steps. We have not had very many instances where that has come to my attention and I monitor these very carefully. If it came to our attention that an arbitrator had intentionally made a material misrepresentation we would remove that arbitrator from our roster."Karen Kupersmith, director of arbitration at NYSE Regulation, a not-for-profit subsidiary that oversees activities of the Big Board's member firms, said the exchange relies on arbitrators to be candid about their potential conflicts. But as financial services firms have grown more complex, the exchange has narrowed the considerations for public arbitrators to exclude anyone who works for a company that may conduct securities transactions or that controls, either directly or indirectly, a brokerage firm, she said.

Previous rules have stated that the spouse of a public arbitrator cannot be engaged in the trading of securities, but under a new rule awaiting Securities and Exchange Commission approval, the list of family members that can disqualify a public arbitrator would also include in-laws, children and parents.

"We are trying to broaden the net and raise awareness," Ms. Kupersmith said. "We also do an ongoing review of arbitrators and classifications through a number of checks and balances which is computer-oriented and picks up things."

The story of the losses incurred by the East Islip firefighters begins like that of so many other investors who lost money during the stock market bubble. Mr. Sirico, their broker, put the group into speculative technology stocks, made risky bets on options and used borrowed money to expand the group's portfolio. In May, Mr. Sirico was fined $10,000 and suspended from associating with any NASD firm for seven months for disclosure failures. He could not be reached for comment.

But trouble in their arbitration began last fall, when Robert W. Cockren, a lawyer at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, became chairman of their arbitration panel and was to act as a public representative.

Mr. Meissner challenged Mr. Cockren's fitness to serve on the panel because of Sonnenschein Nath's extensive relationships with brokerage houses. NASD rules state that any lawyer whose firm receives more than 10 percent of its annual revenue in the prior two years from the securities industry cannot be considered a public arbitrator. But unless law firms disclose the sources of their revenue, it is impossible to determine if such conflicts exist.

NASD denied Mr. Meissner's challenge, saying that the arbitrator had done a "conflict check" with respect to the brokerage firms that were involved in the case. But Mr. Meissner learned through an extensive search that one client of Mr. Cockren's firm was the parent company of a firm being sued in the case. He presented the evidence to NASD and, on Dec. 9, 2005, Mr. Cockren withdrew from the panel.

Mr. Cockren said: "I fully complied with the NASD rules and regulations and nothing that either I or my firm did was improper. We were substantially below the revenue threshold but it wasn't worth my time or energy to deal with the attacks going on."

Mr. Meissner also challenged four other arbitrators that the NASD proposed, saying that all of them either had conflicts or had backgrounds that made them inappropriate representatives of public investors. Three withdrew from consideration, while the fourth is chairman of the panel.

The East Islip association seeks the $614,000 it lost, as well as attorney's fees, court costs and interest. It has also asked for treble damages, amounting to about $1.8 million. Hearings on the case are scheduled for October.

Problem panelists have plagued other arbitrations. Donald L. Sturm, a wealthy Colorado businessman who sold his ownership in a company to WorldCom for stock and then lost $900 million after the telecommunications company collapsed, filed for arbitration against Citigroup in 2003. He contends that Jack B. Grubman, the banking giant's former telecommunications analyst, advised him to hold onto his WorldCom stock even as it was plummeting. Mr. Grubman was barred from the securities industry for life in late 2002.

An NASD arbitration panel ruled against Mr. Sturm in November. But Mr. Sturm's lawyers are asking a federal court to overturn the decision because David H. Drennen, an arbitrator in the matter, failed to disclose past incidents that the lawyers say should have disqualified him or that they could have used as evidence to strike him from the panel.

According to a brief filed in the case, Mr. Drennen, general counsel at Bathgate Capital Partners, an investment firm in Greenwood Village, Colo., failed to disclose an arbitration panel finding from 1996 that a previous employer, "through Drennen's conduct, committed securities fraud." The panel in the case "awarded both the full amount of compensatory damages alleged and punitive damages" according to the brief.

Mr. Drennen, a former NASD regional counsel, declined to comment. In a deposition taken last month in Mr. Sturm's case, he said he recalled the earlier arbitration but said he did not disclose it on his arbitration forms because his conduct was not an issue in the current case. He also said in the deposition that he had testified in the 1996 arbitration on behalf of his employer, attended the entire proceeding and could not identify anyone else at the firm, besides himself, whose conduct was the subject of the case.

MR. STURM'S lawyers say Mr. Drennen's involvement in the current arbitration is problematic in two ways: first, it may make him less objective or sympathetic to an investor accusing a brokerage firm of fraud, and, equally important, his disclosure of his involvement should have disqualified him from serving on the panel handling Mr. Sturm's grievance. NASD rules state that a prospective panelist is unqualified to serve if he or she, within the past seven years, has been the subject of an adverse, investment-related arbitration award of $25,000 or more. The 1996 arbitration involving Mr. Drennen resulted in a $212,103 award and occurred five years before he applied to become an NASD arbitrator.

David E. Warden, a partner at Yetter & Warden in Houston who represented Mr. Sturm, said that a disclosure failure by any arbitrator "not only deprives the parties of their right to make an informed selection decision but also strips any semblance of integrity from the process.

"There doesn't seem to be a watchdog for any of this," he added.

Plaintiffs' lawyers also say that arbitrator biases and conflicts are harder to plumb as financial services firms grow in size and scope. Rosemary J. Shockman, a former president of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, testified before Congress last year that the problem of potentially biased panelists representing the public "continues to grow as various sectors of the financial services industry continue to consolidate their operations in the admitted quest for 'capturing assets' and offering the consumer 'one-stop shopping.' "

J. Boyd Page, a lawyer at Page Perry in Atlanta, said that he has often found that arbitrators assigned to represent the public in a case have close associations with the securities industry. "I just got a proposed panel in Houston and I have 10 so-called public arbitrators that I can pick from," Mr. Page said. "Of those, six had associations with the securities industry. You really wonder about the quality of monitoring."

The potential for conflicts among arbitrators would not be such a problem, defense lawyers say, if investors had an alternative to arbitration. But they do not.

"We believe that arbitrators should be properly classified and that there should be zero conflicts, either real or apparent," Mr. Caruso said. "An arbitrator is supposed to disclose conflicts but there is no follow-through and no system of checks and balances."


 

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